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.IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, ) 
) Docket No-
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) Priority No, 
) Case No. 988329-CA 
v- ) 
) 
David Vance Grovier, ) 
) 
Defendant and Petitioner* ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT (hereinafter "Defendant" 
or "Mr. Grovier") and hereby submits the following as his 
Appellate Brief in the above-captioned matter: 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals in 
this matter pursuant to Rule 5 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
MiyRE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
1. This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying 
Defendant's motion to suppress. Said motion was signed and 
entered by the Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Court Judge in 
.the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County on June 
29, 1998, Said order takes the place of a Notice of Appeal, 
1 
2. On July 11, 1990 the Utah Court of Appeals ordered that 
Defendant's petition for permission to appeal from an 
interlocutory order be granted and that the trial be stayed 
pending the outcome of the merits on appeal. 
3. This is an interlocutory appeal in a criminal case 
wherein defendant is being charged with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §58-38-8, 1953, as amended. This interlocutory appeal 
is from an order denying defendant's motion to suppress. 
SIATEMENXPf^THEL ISSUES^ . PRESENTED FOR ^ REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether the lower court abused its discretion by 
finding that defendant's vehicle was stopped due to probable 
cause* 
2. Whether the lower court abused its discretion by 
failing to find that the detention was illegal. 
3. Whether the lower court abused its discretion by 
failing to find that the defendant's consent to search was 
unlawfully coerced and that the subsequent search exceeded the 
test of State v. Marshall, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 (Ct. App. 1998). 
4. Whether the lower court abused its discretion by 
failing to find that the evidence obtained during the warrantless 
searches should be suppressed. 
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DETERMINATIVE .CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,„ STATUTES AND RULES 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized, 
Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 14. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment. 
FACTS 
The facts material to a consideration of the questions 
presented are as follows: 
1. On February 23, 1990, Officer Lynn Davis of the Cedar 
City Police Department, currently assigned to the Iron/Beaver 
Counties Narcotics Task Force, was at the Circuit Court complex 
located in Cedar City, Utah, when he received a call on his pager 
to contact a confidential informant regarding information about 
the possession or sale of illegal narcotics. 
2. Agent Davis contacted the confidential informant 
(hereinafter referred to as "CI.") regarding the information 
relating to illegal drugs at approximately 18:38 a.m. (See page 
15 of transcript of March 19, 1998, preliminary hearing, 
hereinafter referred to as the "transcript" or "Tr.") The 
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conversation Agent Davis had with the C.I. was all by telephone 
and lasted approximately two to three minutes. (Tr. 22.) 
3. The C.I. informed Agent Davis that (a) there was a 
green Buick vehicle in town, (b) the persons that were driving 
the vehicle had controlled substances in the vehicle and that the 
vehicle was in Cedar City, Utah, (c) the license plate number of 
the vehicle was 175BAT or 175BAP, (d) there were two (2) persons 
in the vehicle: one male and one female, (e) the vehicle was at 
the* south end of town the last time the C.I. saw the vehicle, and 
(f) the C.I. had observed drugs in the vehicle, said drugs 
described as a white powdery or tan powdery substance. (Tr. 15, 
16, 22-31). 
4. Thereafter, Agent Davis relayed this information to 
Cedar City Chief of Police Pete Hansen who, in turn, located the 
subject vehicle and had one of his officers (Sergeant Dennis 
Anderson) effectuate a stop of the vehicle on Main Street in 
Cedar City, Utah, in front of the Iron County/Utah State 
Correctional Facility. (Tr. 33-35.) 
5. Sergeant Anderson was told to stop the vehicle, 
although he was not told why. He assumed that defendant had been 
seen smoking marijuana, although this was not true, he told the 
defendant that was why he was stopped, (June 19, 1998 motion to 
suppress hearing transcript, hereinafter M.Tr., at p. 95.) The 
defendant's vehicle was stopped between 11:15 and 11:38 a.m. 
(Tr. 38.) 
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6. After the vehicle was stopped, Chief Hansen approached 
the passenger, co-defendant below, Petie Kay Hale, and observed 
Officer Kelvin Orton perform a cursory search of her waist area 
for weapons* Chief Hansen then took Petie Kay Hale's "fanny 
pack" (a purse-type bag that wraps around the waist) and inside 
it found a marijuana pipe and a vial which contained traces of 
cocaine. (Tr. 36-38.) 
The district court judge suppressed this evidence on the 
grounds that it was obtained without a warrant and that no 
acceptable exception to a warrantless search existed and that 
therefore it was seized pursuant to an unconstitutional search. 
(Conclusions of Law No. 8) 
7. Thereafter, Chief Hansen gave defendant David Vance 
Grovier his rights per Miranda (Tr. 39) after Anderson had 
informed the defendant they had stopped him because they were 
informed he had drugs in his car and because "a citizen had 
possibly seen him smoking marijuana." (M.Tr. 95) 
8. A request was made to search the car by Chief Hansen, 
and defendant said, "Go ahead and look." (Tr. 39.) 
9. Chief Hansen then "asked him if he understood that—or 
if he was allowing us, giving us consent to search his entire 
car. And he said that he was." (Tr. 39.) Thereafter, Chief 
Hansen instructed Cedar City Police Officers Ken Stapley and 
Ronnie Judkins to search the car for narcotics, which they did, 
and after approximately twenty (28) minutes they could not find 
any narcotics in the vehicle. (Tr. 48.) 
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18. Sergeant Anderson testified that after the officers 
began a second search of the car's interior, the defendant 
repeatedly became upset. Sergeant Anderson testified that the 
defendant said, "There ought to be a law against this kind of 
search." and that he, the defendant, "didn't want [his car] torn 
apart," and that he was going to sue them. (M.Tr. 96.) Defendant 
claims he withdrew his consent to the search (M.Tr. 61.) at that 
time. 
11. Cedar City Police Chief J. Peter Hansen testified that 
he told defendant he could either tell them where the drugs were 
or that he [the chief] would have the car moved into the sally 
port at the jail and that it was his full intention to dismantle 
the car "bolt by bolt," until he found the controlled substances 
in question. Chief Hansen said the defendant then said "Go for 
it. " (Tr. 4 7. ) 
12. Chief Hansen testified that, thereafter, he had the 
vehicle moved to the sally port at the correctional facility 
based upon defendant's consent as well as for safety factors as 
the vehicle was parked at or near a highway at a busy time. (Tr. 
41.) The distance from the place of the initial stop, to the 
sally port garage area of the Iron County/Utah State Correctional 
Facility to where the vehicle was moved, is approximately two 
hundred (288) yards to a 1/4 mile. 
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13. The defendant asserts that he demanded the police 
obtain a search warrant, to "not touch " his car and that the 
words "go for it" were facetious and arose from his assumption 
that his demands were falling on deaf ears. (M.Tr. 61 ??) 
14. The vehicle was subjected to yet another search when it 
arrived inside the secure sally port at the Iron County/Utah 
State Correctional Facility at approximately 12:98 p.m,- Agent 
Lynn Davis was summoned at that time to conduct a third (or 
forth) full search of the vehicle. 
15. During the sally port searches, defendant David Vance 
Grovier was taken to the Iron County/Utah State Correctional 
Facility, was held in a jail [holding] cell in the booking area 
of the correctional facility, and had another conversation with 
Chief Hansen in which defendant said, "You do not have permission 
to dismantle my car," (Tr. 43), whereupon Chief Hansen informed 
the officers "not to dismantle the car" but to continue with the 
search for the narcotics. (Tr. 43-44.) 
16. Defendant also stated during the search that he didn't 
want the officers to tear his car apart, that someone was going 
to get sued over this and that there should be a law against 
looking in peoples' cars. Sergeant Anderson further reported 
that the Defendant stated that he didn't want the officers to 
tear his car apart. (M.Tr. 97-98.) 
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17, After 12:98 noon but before 1:88 p.m., Agent Lynn Davis 
of the Task Force arrived at the sally port, searched the vehicle 
for approximately twenty (28) minutes, and located approximately 
one-third (1/3) pound of the controlled substance methamphetamine 
in a heater hose underneath the driver's portion of the vehicle. 
(Tr. 3-11.) 
18- On March 19, 1998, defendant David Vance Grovier was 
bound over, after a preliminary hearing, on one (1) single count 
of Unlawful Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to 
Distribute, a Second-Degree Felony. 
19. Defendants moved to suppress all evidence seized 
pursuant to the stop, pat down, seizure and search of the 
vehicle. 
28. On June 29, 1998, District Court Judge J. Philip Eves 
ordered that the cocaine and drug paraphernalia found in 
defendant Petie Kay Hale's fanny pack be suppressed as a matter 
of law. 
21. In that same order, the judge ordered that the 
methamphetamine found in the heater hose should not be 
suppressed. Defendants subsequently filed this interlocutory 
appeal to challenge that portion of the judge's order. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State's seizure and search of defendant's car was 
without a warrant and outside the recognized exceptions to the 
warrant requirement. When the State conducts a warrantless 
search, the State must carry its burden of proof that the search 
was reasonable and constitutional* 
Under the totality of the circumstances, defendant's 
"consent" to an extended search was not given freely, 
unequivocally, specifically and intelligently- Rather, such 
consent was extracted under the shadow of authority, threat, 
coercion and duress* 
Prior to and after defendant was taken to jail, he attempted 
to withdraw his previous consent to a roadside search when the 
search escalated at the roadside and at the correctional 
facility. The State neither carried its burden of proof nor 
overcame the presumption against the waiver of a fundamental 
constitutional right. Therefore, the evidence found as a result 
of the search should be suppressed. 
Standard of review. 
When reviewing conclusions of law, the appellate court 
reviews them for correctness and gives no particular deference to 
the lower court's conclusions. Berube_v^._ Fashipr\ Centre, Ltd., 
771 P.2d 1833, (Utah 1989); Scharf„v. BMG_ Cpr£._, 786 P.2d 1068, 
1878 (Utah 1985). (The appellate court is free to reappraise the 
trial court's legal conclusions.) Furthermore, findings of fact 
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that proceed from stipulated facts are treated as conclusions of 
1 aw. Zion's First Nat' 1 Bank v. National Am* Title JLQSJL* 749 
P.2d 651, 656 (Utah 1988). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: The lower court abused its discretion by 
finding that the extended detention of the defendant, 
which exceeded the limits of the Jerry search, was 
legal* 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 
Article If Section 14, of the Utah Constitution, require the 
protection of citizens against unwarranted intrusions into their 
privacy. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched, -and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, §14. 
In the present case, the police seized defendant and his 
vehicle on the basis of a tip from a confidential informant and 
searched defendant's car without a warrant. The Utah Supreme 
Court, in State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (1987) delineated 
three recognized levels of permissible police intrusion absent a 
warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at any time and 
pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained 
against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if 
the officer has "articulable suspicion" that the person 
has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, 
16 
the "detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect it the 
officer has probable cause to believe an offense has 
been committed or is being committed. 
739 P.2d 617 quoting U.JS^v... Merr i tt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 
1984) • 
A level two detention based on "articulable suspicion" is 
now said to be based on "reasonable suspicion." State v.MenKe, 
128 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 33-34 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. 
Dronebjjrg. 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 28 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. 
Sery, 87 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 45 (1988) citing Umted_States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 6969 (1983). Codified in Utah Code Ann. §77-~7~ 
15. 
A police officer was directed to defendant by a confidential 
informant who supplied the police -officer with conclusory 
statements regarding contraband in defendant's car. (Tr. 3^-36.) 
No officer gave testimony of the reliability or credibility of 
the informant or as to the basis of the informant's information 
The conclusory statements of a confidential informant may 
create reasonable suspicion, but such statements do not rise to 
the level of probable cause. Drpneburg, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
28. Given that the fanny pack evidence was properly suppressed, 
there was no additional evidence to raise the police power from 
the level of reasonable suspicion to that of probable cause. 
Therefore, the initial stop could not have been under a level 
three, probable cause authority, and the trial court erre<l in 
finding that the police officer had probable cause to stop and 
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seize defendant's vehicle. Indeed, the police found no new 
evidence in the 20 minute search of the car, or in fact, any 
evidence at all to support the conclusions of the informant. 
If the police were acting under no more than a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that a crime had been 
committed, the police were then limited to the authority to 
search under Tersy_v._Ohiq, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961). The scope of that search is the minimum 
intrusion necessary to dispel or confirm reasonable suspicions, 
392 U.S. at 29. 
In the present case, the officer exercised the full extent 
of the allowable "minimum intrusion" in the street search of the* 
vehicle. That search took twenty to thirty minutes, and included 
a search of the passenger compartment, the trunk, beneath the c.\r 
and the engine compartment. 
"Minimum intrusion" was exceeded when defendant was 
handcuffed, taken to a cell in the police station, and detained 
for another ninety minutes while the police proceeded to 
dismantle his car which had been impounded at the police station. 
This excessive intrusion is a prior illegality exploited by the 
police to gain the fictitious consent relied on for the 
subsequent search. 
Defendant concedes that a reasonable suspicion may have 
existed for the initial stop. Thus, the police were entitled to 
detain the defendant temporarily under a level two detention tor 
reasonable suspicion. That stop, however, grew into a two hour 
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detention, ninety minutes of which was in a cell at the police 
station. 
This extended detention was longer than necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop, and so became a de facto 
arrest. Defendant, however, was never told that he had a right 
to refuse to consent to the continued search of his car. This 
illegal act by the police taints any consent mal'ing it 
presumptively coercive. Therefore, any evidence gathered as a 
result of defendant's "consent" should be suppressed. (See Towers 
andmRobinson, infra, point 5.) 
POINT 2: The lower court abused its discretion by 
finding that the State had probable cause to stop and 
seize defendant's vehicle, and in applying incorrect 
inferences from that conclusion. 
The trial court misapplied the concept of probable cause in 
the present case. Because the conclusory statements of a 
confidential informant may supply only a reasonable suspicion of 
a crime, and because there was no other evidence to elevate the 
State's suspicion to probable cause, there was no probable cause 
for the police to detain defendant for two hours, handcuffed and 
in a cell, nor to impound his car and search it by way of a bolt 
by bolt dismantlement. 
The trial court misconstrued the effect of probable cause. 
Even if the police did have probable cause to stop defendant, the 
corresponding police power is to arrest the cuspect. A formal 
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arrest would result in the defendant being informed of his r ight 
to consult with an attorney, who, in turn, could inform the 
defendant of his right to refuse consent to the search. 
A search following the arrest would have been 
constitutional only if a search warrant were obtained or if there 
were a legitimate exception to the warrant requirement. State v. 
Laroccp, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 14, 15 (1998). Presumably, the 
probable cause for arrest would persuade a neutral, detached 
magistrate to issue a search warrant for the car. 
However, the State's (second) formal arrest of defendant 
(for the possession of methamphetamine) was made after the 
search. The police made no attempt to obtain a warrant for the 
search of defendant's vehicle. The State should not 3»"u n 
additional authority to search by reason of probable cau^c 
without an arrest or search warrant on the basis of that probable 
cause. 
Therefore, this court should hold that the trial court e-:rrc-d 
in concluding that there was probable cause for the search of 
defendant's vehicle. If this court does allow the trial court1": 
finding of probable cause to stop defendant, then this court 
should deny any effect of the probable cause that would allow 
broader justification of police power for the subsequent-
warrant less search. 
\A 
POINT 3: The lower court erred in finding that 
defendant continued to consent to the extended search 
of his vehicle at the correctional facility. 
Warrantless searches are unreasonable per se unless they 
fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement of 
the fourth amendment, St a t e_ y.._ T o we r. s ....and Robinson, 148 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 16 ( C t. App. 1998); S. t a t e.. y.„. M e.nj< e , 12 8 Utah Adv. Rep, 
at 35. In the case at bar, the state relies on the consent 
except ion. 
The state claims that the defendant consented to a request 
to search his car with his reply of "Go for it." Defendant 
claims he told the police to get a warrant before they searched 
his car. 
A search is legal under the Fourth Amendment if it is 
conducted as a result of the defendant's voluntary consent. 
S t a, t e v.... M a £.s h.alJL. 13 2 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 5, 49 ( C t. App, 1 9 9 0 ) ; 
i £ h n eck lpjt jl_y.... Must, a mo n t.e , 412 U.S. 218, 219 (197 3 ) ; St ate y,. 
lierra* 754 P.2d 972, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
It is the State's burden to prove that a consent to search 
wa s voluntary. Ro.b.i nso n, 148 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah C t. App. 
19 9 8 ) ; U n.i t.e ^  . 4 4 6 u • s • 5 4 4 » 5 5 7 (1988); 
Sjch ne c kljo t. h, 412 U.S. at 222; Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. a t 15. 
That burden of proof is particularly heavy. Statey.Marshall, 
132 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 ( C t., A p p. 1998); Bumper y, No rjr. h C a ro 1 i. n a , 
391 U.S. 543 (1968); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) . There is a 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional 
rights. U.... S .v., Abbot., 546 F . 2 d 883, 885 (18th Cir, 1977). 
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This court should reverse the lower court's findings that 
defendant's consent was voluntary. As argued below in this 
memorandum, there was no consent untainted by the atmosphere of 
coercion and duress and defendant did not consent freely and 
intelligently. Finally, any consent that defendant may have given 
was later withdrawn or restricted in scope. 
A. Under the totality of the circumstances, 
defendant's consent was not voluntary, rather it was 
the product of coercion and duress. 
,f[T]he question [of] whether a consent to a search was in 
fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, 
express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined trorn 
the totality of all the circumstances." Schneckloth, 412 U ^, .it 
227. See also, Robinson, 148 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Ut. Ct, App, 
1998) 
In examining the totality of all the circumstances, a court 
must take into account both the details of police conduct and the 
characteristics of the accused, .State v. ..Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 13, June 28, 1998, at 15, which include "subtly coercive 
police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective 
state of the person who consents." Schneck l.oth, 41? U.S. at 2?9. 
Some of the circumstances to be considered in determining if 
consent was truly voluntary include (1) the duration of 
detention, Robijison, 148 Utah Adv. Rep, 16 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998) ; 
(2) the conditions of confinement, (3) threats to property, (4) 
16 
threats of further detention, Id.; (5) threats to obtain a search 
warrant, Id. (6) defendant's vulnerability, Robinson, 140 Utah 
Ad, Rep. at 19; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229; and (7) defendant's 
knowledge of his right to refuse consent, Robinson, 140 Utah Adv, 
Rep. at 28 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998). 
Taken objectively, the circumstances demonstrate that 
defendant could not have given consent free of coercion to the 
extended search of his vehicle* The record shows that defendant 
was not aware of his right to refuse consent. (M.Tr. 95) 
Further, after the thirty minute roadside detention, defendant 
was further detained at the police station for another ninety 
minutes where he was handcuffed and later placed in jail. 
By the time defendant had been moved to the jail, he was no 
longer free to move^about, he was either handcuffed or in a eel), 
and he was surrounded by the police. In short, defpndant was 
under de facto arrest and subject to more than a shadow of 
authority. 
Defendant was aware that the police had impounded hie car 
and that they were about to dismantle it bolt by bolt absent hi > 
consent. The police had stated that he would be further detained 
during the dismantlement. Officer Hansen told defendant that tie 
intended to get a search warrant to dismantle the car. (Tr. 17.) 
Short of a strip search, the police had done all they could to 
render defendant vulnerable. 
In addition, the police were on notice of defendant's 
ignorance of his right to refuse consent to further search of his 
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car by defendant's statement: "There ought to be a law to prevent 
this [i.e., the search of his car]." (M.Tr. 95) 
Defendant's statement demonstrates that his consent was not 
intelligently given. There is a law against searches without 
consent, the fourth amendment of the federal constitution as well 
as the analogous Utah constitutional provision. 
Defendant's statements, "There ought to be a law," "Someone 
is going to get sued over this," and "Don't take my car apart." 
(M.Tr. 95-96) show his state of mind that he was withdrawing or 
restricting his consent as does Anderson's testimony about 
defendant's agitated condition. (M.Tr. 98) 
The State failed to overcome its burden to show that 
defendant's "consent" was freely given. This court should 
therefore reverse the lower court's finding that defondant' -> 
"consent" was voluntary. Further, this court should suppress all 
evidence recovered as a result of the coerced consent. 
"* B. As a matter of law, the trial court should have found 
that defendant effectively withdrew his consent to the search. 
By the time the police resumed their search of defendant's 
car at the police station, the police had already checked the 
floor, trunk and under the seat of the vehicle during the highway 
search. The police then informed defendant of their intent to 
take the car apart as soon as the search resumed at the police 
station. (Tr. 14.) 
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Defendant's imperative, "'Don't dismantle my car," (Tr. 45.) 
should be construed under the circumstances as a termination of 
any earlier consent he may have given to the warrantless search. 
The chief of police was aware of defendant's desire to at 
least restrict the scope of the search- (Tr. 43) Chief Hansen 
chose to interpret the defendant's statement as " Don't dismantle 
my car with tools," a request to not use jackhammers and tools to 
destroy the vehicle. (Tr.45, 46) 
The chief could have asked defendant to clarify his 
statement, but he chose not to. By choosing not to ask for a 
clarification of defendant's remarks, the police revealed their 
bad faith and denied defendant an opportunity to terminate the 
search in accordance with his constitutional rights. 
Defendant had withdrawn his permission for the specific type 
of search that the police had informed him they were going to do. 
that is dismantlement. The chief of police should have been 
alert to the fact that defendant had withdrawn his permission for 
the police to conduct any type of search concerning his car. 
Under the circumstances, defendant's continued consent was not 
specific and unequivocal. 
The State failed to support their burden of proof and 
overcome the presumption against a waiver of a fundamental 
constitutional right. This court should therefore find that 
defendant had withdrawn his unequivocal consent to search c*nd 
that the subsequent search was illegal and that all fruits of the 
illegal search should therefore be suppressed. 
19 
POINT Az Alternatively, defendant restricted the scope 
of his consent to search his vehicle. 
If this court does not hold that defendant effectively 
withdrew consent to any search, then this court should hold that 
defendant restricted the scope of his consent and that the police 
acted beyond those restrictions. 
In the present case, defendant told the police not to fake} 
his car apart. Ignoring defendant's request, the police then 
"accidentally" disassembled the heater hose. The chief of police 
acknowledged that defendant was limiting the scope of hiz 
consent. (Tr. 17.) The chief interpreted defendant's statement 
to mean that he did not mind a dismantling of his car so long as 
tools weren't used. Such a self serving interpretation was not 
warranted by defendant's words, his surroundings, the 
circumstances or case law. 
Any voluntary consent given by defendant allows the police 
to search only the specific area agreed to by the defendant. 
Marshall, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. at 49. "The scope of a consent 
search is limited by the breadth of the actual consent itself. . 
. . Any police activity that transcends the actual scope of the 
consent given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights ot the 
suspect." United„States v. Gay, 774 F.?d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 
1985); see, e.jg., PeopJLe v_. Thiret, 685 P.?d 193, ?%\ (Colo. 
1984) (scope of consent exceeded when police asked to " loot 
around" the house, then conducted a 45~minute search of rooms, 
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drawers, boxes and closed containers). In short, defendant's 
request that his car not be dismantled, means specifically that. 
His car should be left intact. Defendant has a constitutional 
right to limit the scope of his consent. 
This court should therefore find that the defendant 
effectively limited his consent so that any dismantling of his 
car would constitute an illegal search. Therefore, this court 
should hold that all evidence of the illegal search be 
suppressed, 
Point 5: The only method that can insure that consent 
to a warrantless search is intelligently given is when 
that consent follows an explanation by the police that 
there is a right to refuse to give the required 
consent. 
Defendant was never informed of his right to refuse consent, 
Thi£ court has demonstrated its concern over "consent" searches. 
State v „,_ Sierra, 754 P,2d 972 (Utah Ct, App. 1988) et a 1. Most 
recently, this court noted that the state brought forth no 
evidence that a defendant "was aware or was informed that he did 
not have to accede to the trooper's request [to search]." 
RokLQSOD • 1A® Utah Adv. Re p, 16 (U t C t. A p p, 1996), In t he 
present case, Chief Hansen interpreted defendant's statement to 
the advantage of the police, although the law presumes against a 
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. 
1 n
 BP-ba ..Q.s on, this court quotes approvingly from U, S . y, 
J.P..D.?.§» 846 F,2d 358, 361 (6 th Cir. 1988) which requires an 
express explanation of a suspect's right to refuse consent to the 
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search. Similarly, the law in this jurisdiction should require a 
specific, express explanation before a suspect can consent to a 
search. 
Absent such an explanation, the average detainee i-, not 
likely to know that he or she has a right not to consent or to 
withdraw consent- Presently, the constitutional right to 
withhold or withdraw consent is only available to those few who 
are sophisticated in the intricacies of criminal legal procedure, 
Scjineckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. Absent a -specific, express 
explanation of the right to refuse consent, the courts are left 
with the difficult evaluation of whether a fundamental 
constitutional right has been waived or whether the ippa rent-
waiver was coerced. Therefore, Utah should require that-
specific, express explanation oe given to suspects of their rigut 
to refuse consent to a search without a warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse the lower court's denial of his 
motion to suppress and to order that the evidence derived from 
the search and seizure of defendant's vehicle be suppressed. 
DATED this (o day of September, 1998. 
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